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Abstract. In the last years, the work by Engerman and Sokoloff (ES) on the divergent 
development paths within the Americas has provided an important backing to the institutionalist 
school. In line with the work by Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, ES assume the existence of 
institutional persistence: once accepted the resilient nature of the institutional framework, it 
becomes easier to trace a link between an adverse colonial heritage and an unsatisfactory 
economic performance at present. Nevertheless, this interpretation, satisfactory as it is at the 
‘big picture’ level, may also obscure both the presence of noteworthy causal relations and the 
agency of other actors. I am concerned with two questions. First: How to explain substantial 
differences in economic performance (particularly, land inequality) between ES’s same type of 
colony? Second: Is it possible to include the role of non-European agency in the development 
narrative? The comparative study of the plantation economies of Saint Domingue and Cuba at 
the late colonial period sheds light on these issues. The intrinsic instability of the plantation 
colonies and, in some cases, the outbreak of slave rebellions with their visible impact on the 
institutions and the economic performance suggest more nuanced analysis. I conclude that the 
recognition of both political economy factors and non-European agency in the process of 
economic change could benefit ongoing research on the (colonial) origins of comparative 
development. 
Key words: Factor endowments, institutions, inequality, politics, plantation colonies, slave 
rebellions, land redistribution. 
JEL Classification: F54, O13,  O54, P16, P52. 
Resumen. En los últimos años, los trabajos de Engerman y Sokoloff (ES) sobre las trayectorias 
de desarrollo divergentes en el continente americano han proporcionado un importante 
respaldo a la escuela institucionalista. En línea con las propuestas de Acemoglu, Johnson y 
Robinson, ES asumen la existencia de persistencia institucional: una vez aceptada la resistente 
naturaleza del marco institucional, resulta más fácil trazar un vínculo entre una herencia 
colonial adversa y un insuficiente desempeño económico en la actualidad. Sin embargo, esta 
interpretación, satisfactoria como es grosso modo, es susceptible de oscurecer tanto la 
presencia de otras significativas relaciones causa-consecuencia como la iniciativa tomada por 
agentes particulares. Este trabajo se articula en torno a dos interrogantes. Primero: ¿cómo es 
posible explicar la existencia de diferencias sustanciales en el desempeño económico 
(concretamente, en el nivel de desigualdad en la propiedad de la tierra) entre colonias incluidas 
dentro de una misma categoría por ES? Segundo: ¿es posible incluir el papel jugado por 
agentes no europeos dentro de la historia del desarrollo? El estudio comparado de 
las economías de plantación de Saint-Domingue y Cuba al final de la etapa colonial ayuda a 
responder estas preguntas. La inherente inestabilidad de las colonias de plantación y, en 
ciertos casos, el estallido de rebeliones de esclavos – con su inmediato impacto sobre las 
instituciones y el desempeño económico de estas regiones – sugieren un análisis con muchos 
más matices. El trabajo concluye que el reconocimiento tanto de los factores de economía 
política como de la iniciativa no europea en el proceso de cambio económico podría resultar 
beneficioso para la actual investigación en torno a los orígenes (coloniales) del desarrollo 
comparado. 
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Eia pour ceux qui n'ont jamais rien inventé 
Pour ceux qui n'ont jamais rien exploré  
Pour ceux qui n'ont jamais rien dompté 
Mais ils s'abandonnent, saisis, à l'essence de toute chose  
Ignorants des surfaces mais saisis par le mouvement de toute chose  
Insoucieux de dompter, mais jouant le jeu du monde. 
Aimé Césaire, Cahiers d’un retour au pays natal. 
 
Sabemos ya muy bien 
que no hay otras moradas sino aquellas 
que en la sangre encontramos, invisibles. 
Y que el solo camino  
es ese que hay que abrirse 
con el alma y las manos, 
espadas de aire, frente a pechos de aire. 
Pedro Salinas, Razón de Amor.  
  
Sonarán las campanas 
 desde los campanarios, 
 y los campos desiertos 
 volverán a granar 
 unas espigas altas 
 dispuestas para el pan. 
José Antonio Labordeta, Canto a la libertad.  
In Memoriam.  
 
 
 1. Introduction 
 
“¿Pero qué es la historia de América toda sino una crónica de lo real-maravilloso?” 
El Reino de Este Mundo, Alejo Carpentier (1904-1980)  
 
Far from having reached a consensus, comparative economic history is 
still seized by doubt when it comes to explain the fundamental causes of 
the late 18th-century Western economic take-off. The so-called ‘European 
miracle’ gave rise to the ‘Great Divergence’ and, as the Figure 1.1 shows, 
Western Europe and the ‘Neo-Europes’ escaped from the Malthusian 
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trap and left the rest of the world behind.1 The complex and exceptional 
nature of this process has encouraged abundant economic and historical 
research and, at present, two hypotheses compete for its explanation. 
The geography thesis, led by Jared Diamond and Jeffrey Sachs, has 
focused on the comparative advantage of coastal temperate zones and 
the ecology-specific nature of most basic technologies.2 The determinism 
of this hypothesis has faced, however, the sound opposition of the 
institutionalist school: around the 1800s, it is argued, the different world 
regions did not experience a widening of their previous relative positions 
but a ‘reversal of fortunes’.3 This institutionalist offensive has proceeded 
in two successive waves. Around the 1970s and 1980s, the seminal works 
by Douglass North highlighted the role of well-defined property rights 
and the rule of law as irreplaceable elements in any social organization 
aimed at capital accumulation and higher income levels.4 In the early 
2000s, Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson and James Robinson (AJR) 
have moved the discussion several centuries back: differences at the 
institutional level can explain why previously poor regions joined 
Western Europe in its road to modern economic growth and others did 
not. Put it simply: divergent trajectories of development have colonial 
origins.5                                                         
1 On the ‘European miracle’ and the ‘Great Divergence’, see Eric Jones, The European 
Miracle: Environments, Economies and Geopolitics in the History of Europe and Asia 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) and Kenneth Pomeranz, The Great 
Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy (Princeton, 
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000). ‘Neo-Europes’ is the term used by Crosby in 
Alfred Crosby, Ecological Imperialism: The Biological Expansion of Europe, 900-1900 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986). 
2 Representative works by these authors are: Jared Diamond, Guns, Germs and Steel: A short 
history of everybody for the last 13,000 years (London: Vintage, 2005 [1997]), Jeffrey Sachs, 
“Institutions don’t rule: Direct Effects of Geography on Per Capita Income”, National 
Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 9490, 2003; and John Gallup, Jeffrey Sachs 
and Andrew Mellinger, “Geography and Economic Development”, National Bureau of 
Economic Research Working Paper 6849, 1998. 
3 ‘Reversal of fortune’ is the expression used in the important paper by Daron Acemoglu, 
Simon Johnson and James Robinson, “Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in 
the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution”, The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, Vol. 117, No. 4, 2002. 
4 See, by Douglass North, “Institutional Change and Economic Growth”, The Journal of 
Economic History, Vol. 31, No. 1, 1971 and Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic 
Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). Jointly with Robert Thomas, 
see “An Economic Theory of the Growth of the Western World”, The Economic History 
Review, Vol. 23, No. 1, 1970 and The Rise Of The Western World. A New Economic 
History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976). 
5 Two works are the most representative of this second institutionalist wave: Daron 
Acemoglu, Simon Johnson and James Robinson, “The Colonial Origins of Comparative 
Development: An Empirical Investigation”, The American Economic Review, Vol. 91, No. 
5, 2001, and “Reversal of Fortune”. On the internal controversies of the institutionalist 
school, see Pranab Bardhan, “Institutions matter, but which ones?”, Economics of 
Transition, Vol. 13, No. 3, 2005. 
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Figure 1.1. The ‘Great Divergence’ 
 
Source: Reproduced from Gregory Clark, A Farewell to Alms. A Brief Economic History of 
the World. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007. 
 
Stanley Engerman and Kenneth Sokoloff (ES) argue with respect to the 
Americas what AJR suggest regarding a broader sample of 64 countries: 
colonial institutions explain much of current economic performance6. ES 
do not point at the feasibility of European settlement, as AJR do, but to 
different factor endowments (climate, soil quality, population density) 
when it comes to explain the emergence of particular sets of colonial 
institutions. Nevertheless, they both agree on a key point: the existence 
of institutional persistence. Precisely, only accepting that the 
institutional structure implemented by a number of Europeans in the 
colonies is resistant to change, it is possible to link current economic 
performance and colonial presence in the same causal chain. It is 
precisely that premise what allows and encourages the current 
convergence between the research agendas of economic growth theory 
and economic history.  
This effort of ‘trying to explain much with little’ is both laudable and 
useful. Figure 1.2 lends itself to this interpretation. Advanced 
quantitative research confirms its validity.7 However, several problems 
arise. The political disorder experienced south from Río Grande between                                                         
6 Stanley Engerman and Kenneth Sokoloff, “Factor Endowments, Inequality and Paths of 
Development among New World Economies”, National Bureau of Economic Research 
Working Paper 9259, 2002. 
7 Ewout Frankema, “The Colonial Origins of Inequality: Exploring the Causes and 
Consequences of Land Distribution”, Ibero-America Institute for Economic 
Research/Georg-August-Universität Göttingen, Discussion Paper No. 119, 2005. 
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1820 and 1870 suggests  a  forever  lost  institutional  equilibrium  rather  
than  a  resilient politico-legal organization able to impose old corporate 
interests under new republican costumes. Thus, in the last years, it is not 
surprising that several works have tried to clarify both the significance 
and the functioning of politics as a plausible explanation of divergent 
development paths.8 
 
Figure 1.2. The ‘Great (colonial) Divergence’ in the Americas. 
 
 Evolution of per capita income, 1990 International Geary-Khamis dollars 
 
 
Source: The author with data from Angus Maddison, The World Economy. Historical 
Statistics (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2003). 
 
This paper joins these efforts. Specifically, I am concerned with two 
questions that highlight the limits of the ES’s theoretical framework. 
First, how to explain substantial differences in land inequality between 
the plantation colonies of Saint Domingue (present-day Haiti) and Cuba? 
Controlling for factor endowments and according to the hypothesis of 
institutional persistence, ES predict that a high degree of wealth 
inequality with origins in the colonial era should have endured over time 
in both ex-colonies as a consequence of land policies aimed to preserve                                                         
8 Representative works are Douglass North, William Summerhill and Barry Weingast, 
“Order, Disorder and Economic Change: Latin America vs. North America” in Bueno de 
Mesquita, B. and Root, H. L. (eds), Governing for Prosperity (New Haven, Connecticut: 
Yale University Press, 2000) and Jeffrey Nugent and James Robinson, “Are Endowments 
Fate?”, Centre for Economic Policy Research Discussion Paper 3206, 2005. 
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elites’ privileged position. Nothing further from the truth. Whereas the 
Gini indexes for former West Indies plantation colonies are within a quite 
compact range of values around 80, Haiti showed in 1971 a Gini 
coefficient of 46.2, a value much closer to (and even lower than) Sweden’s 
(48.8 in 1961) or US’s (71.9 in 1987) ones.9 To answer this question 
requires looking inside the political economy conditions of both colonies. 
In the French colony of Saint Domingue, the only successful slave 
rebellion in history was able to overturn the plantation economy and 
replace it completely by a small-sized subsistence farming system at the 
beginning of the 19th century. In Spanish Cuba, however, an apparently 
identical socio-economic organization did not generate any significant 
challenge from inside. Although the colonial system was eventually 
eroded and dismantled, the plantation economy and the associated land 
inequality endured for a long time. 
The second question also leads us to the thorough study of both slave 
societies. Is it possible to include slave agency in the development 
narrative of plantation colonies? If so, how? Both AJR and ES leave 
small room for this. Their hypotheses support the view that the set of 
institutions partly responsible for current economic performance were the 
direct outcome of European response to environmental and demographic 
conditions. Native or slave populations would only enter in their 
narratives either as a mass of anonymous coerced labourers or, at best, as 
accomplices in the resource extraction strategy put in motion in non-
settlers colonies. Cristopher Bayly, from the perspective of a South Asia 
social historian, and Gareth Austin, as a West Africa economic historian, 
have refuted these implications, demonstrating how bottom-up 
experiences, beyond colonisers’ control, were not only frequent but 
significant.10 In the context of the Americas and, specifically, of the 
plantation colonies, research made on slave rebellions provides us with a 
considerable amount of information to study carefully what was the 
precise role of slaves in the making of their own history.11 Again, the 
stark contrast with respect to slave agency between Saint Domingue and 
Cuba justifies their comparative study.  
                                                        
9 Data from Frankema, “Colonial Origins”, 29-32. 
10 See Christopher Bayly, “Indigenous and Colonial Origins of Comparative Economic 
Development: The Case of Colonial India and Africa”, World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper No. 4474, 2008, and Gareth Austin, “The ‘reversal of fortune’ thesis and the 
compression of history: Perspectives from African and comparative economic history”, 
Journal of International Development, Vol. 20, No. 8, 2008. 
11 Outstanding studies are the ones by Eugene Genovese, From Rebellion to Revolution. 
Afro-American Slave Revolts in the Making of the Modern World (Baton Rouge, Lousiana: 
Lousiana State University Press, 1979) and Michael Craton, Testing the Chains. Resistance to 
Slavery in the British West Indies (Ithaka, NY: Cornell University Press, 1981). 
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The contributions of this paper are twofold. The first is theoretical: I 
shall advance in the study of political forces as a plausible variable in 
explaining institutional change and economic performance. Analysing 
the determinants of slave agency in the plantation colonies of Saint 
Domingue and Cuba as well as the impact of the Saint Domingue 
revolution in the degree of land inequality allows me to qualify ES’s 
theses. Far from accepting a direct causal relation between the colonial 
regime and current performance, the answers to the two referred 
questions lead me to conclude that, somewhere in between, politics 
mattered and that, rather than exogenous, they were largely the outcome 
of the colonial system itself. The second is historical: I shall present a 
necessarily brief but precise comparative study of the political economies 
of Saint Domingue and Cuba at the late colonial era. In the last two 
centuries, both colonies have received a fair amount of attention by the 
scholars.12  However, I am not aware of others who have undertaken a 
comparative analysis as the one I present here. Only from a comparative 
perspective it is possible to shed light enough on the real and not so 
subtle differences between apparently similar regions.  
In the first two sections I survey the literature. Once presented the main 
theses of ES as well as related empirical research, I pay attention to the 
debate on the role of political economy factors in the development 
process. The third section provides a brief historical narrative on Saint 
Domingue and Cuba at the late colonial period whereas the fourth 
analyses this evidence in order to shed light on the relationship between 
plantation colonies, slave rebellions and land redistribution. The last 
section concludes. 
 
2. Factor endowments, inequality and institutional persistence. 
 
ES establish a link between factor endowments and pro-development 
institution building. Under their approach, inequality attains a 
prominent explanatory position as it provides the intermediate step 
between both extremes of the causal chain.13 
They differentiate among three types of European colonies in the New 
World according to their different geographic, climatic and demographic                                                         
12 In the case of Saint Domingue, the classical study is Cyril R. L. James, The Black Jacobins. 
Toussaint L’Ouverture and The San Domingo Revolution (London: Penguin Books, 2001 
[1938]) and in the case of Cuba, of course, the meticulous work by Hugh Thomas, Cuba or 
The Pursuit of Freedom (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1971). 
13 Engerman and Sokoloff, “Factor Endowments”. 
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conditions. In the Caribbean and Brazil, tropical climate and soil 
composition favoured the cultivation of crops characterized by extensive 
scale economies and a labour intensive nature. A reduced number of 
natives as well as contingents of unwilling Europeans could not supply 
the labour workforce that the sugar, coffee or tobacco cultivation 
required. Hence, slavery became the labour system on which the 
flamboyant prosperity of these colonies was based. In mainland Spanish 
America, particularly the Andean region and Central America, an 
abundant native population, who survived the encounter with Spaniards, 
had frequently been enslaved by pre-Columbian empires. Continuation in 
the exploitation of mineral resources convinced Spaniards to adapt those 
pre-conquest arrangements. In stark contrast, a third group of colonies, 
the northern colonies of North America, was characterized by a quite 
different set of factor endowments. The size of the native population was 
not substantial. Temperate climate encouraged European settlement 
and, together with soil conditions, it favoured the growing of scale-
indifferent crops such as wheat. Superabundance of land and low capital 
requirements worked against attempts to introduce large landholdings 
with tenant or indentured labour. A free peasantry of European could 
develop.  
According to ES, the resulting degree of inequality persisted over time 
through its effect on institutions and policies. In the Caribbean, Brazil 
and the Viceroyalties of New Spain and Peru, masses of landless workers, 
either natives or African blooded, were deprived of any access to wealth, 
human capital and political power. The white elites, by contrast, with a 
large wealth based on the monopolisation of crop cultivation, mineral 
extraction and their commercialization, could easily design institutions 
and implement policies tending to preserve their privileged status quo. 
The absence of such a clear-cut racial, economic and political polarization 
in Canada and the mid- and north-Atlantic regions of the present-day 
United States showed a very different outcome. There, a less sizeable and 
powerful elite faced a large mass of free peasants with a similar (and 
reasonable) degree of imported human capital: the process of institution 
building and subsequent policy implementation was inevitably shaped in 
a more egalitarian fashion. Comparative studies on the origins and 
evolution of institutions and policies regarding immigration, land, 
suffrage, schooling or taxation within the Americas corroborate this basic 
insight.14                                                         
14 See the institution-specific studies by Engerman, Sokoloff and collaborators: Elisa Mariscal 
and Kenneth Sokoloff, “Schooling, Suffrage, and the Persistence of Inequality in the 
Americas, 1800-1945” in Haber, S. (ed.), Political Institutions and Economic Growth in 
Latin America (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution  Press, 2000); Stanley Engerman and 
Kenneth Sokoloff, “The Evolution of Suffrage Institutions in the New World”, Journal of 
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Land policy provides a meaningful example for the purposes of this 
paper.15 With a large stock of land under governmental control and an 
economic structure revolving around agriculture throughout the 
Americas, public decisions on land distribution should be regarded as 
quite revealing about the anti- or pro-egalitarian stance of the political 
elites. The 1862 Homestead Act in the United Stated and the 1872 
Dominion Lands Act in Canada appear then as the culmination of a 
policy geared towards the promotion of land access by smallholders. In 
Mexico, however, the confiscation of native communal lands did not 
produce the same result. Rather than encouraging the rise of a 
commercial smallholding class, the 1857 Constitution and Porfirio Díaz’s 
regime (1876-1910) granted a significant portion of these lands to large 
holders and foreign firms. Figures speak for themselves: whereas in rural 
Mexico in 1910 only 2.4% of household heads owned land, in the States 
in 1900 and in Canada in 1901 these figures were 74.5% and 87.1% 
respectively. Persistence of economic and political polarization over time 
in societies with an initial higher degree of inequality seems thus a quite 
plausible hypothesis. 
Empirical evidence corroborates these theses.16 Table 2.1 can be seen as a 
rough test of ES’s theory. It is observed how the range of values for 
plantation colonies and Spanish American differs greatly from a North 
American pair closer to 50. Bear in mind that an overall United States 
figure conceals a sharp distinction between North and South. 
Additionally, Ewout Frankema provides further econometric support: 
the hypothesis that feasibility of cash crop production has no significant 
impact on land inequality is rejected at the 95% confidence level. 
Similarly, relative land abundance and a less egalitarian land distribution 
go hand in hand. His first enquiry about the structural factors behind 
land inequality obtains a clear-cut response: “A typical ‘unequal’ country 
is a land abundant catholic country whose geographic conditions support the 
production of coffee and sugar more than the production of rice, which has 
comparatively favourable settler conditions, such that a minority of white                                                                                                                                              
Economic History, Vol 65, 2005; Kenneth Sokoloff and Eric Zolt, “Inequality and the 
Evolution of Institutions of  Taxation: Evidence from the Economic History of the 
Americas” in Edwards, S., Esquivel, G. and Márquez, G., The Decline of Latin American 
Economies: Growth, Institutions, and Crises (Cambridge, Massachussets: National Bureau of 
Economic Research Books, 2007); Stanley Engerman, Elisa Mariscal and Kenneth Sokoloff, 
“The Evolution of Schooling Institutions in the Americas, 1800-1925” in Eltis, D., Lewis, F. 
and Sokoloff, K. (eds.), Human Capital and Institutions: A Long Run View (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
15 This example is presented in Engerman and Sokoloff, “Factor Endowments”, 20-22. 
16 Obviously, other scholars have critized ES’s hypothesis. I have found particularly interesting 
Nathan Nunn, “Slavery, Inequality, and Economic Development in the Americas: An 
Examination of the Engerman-Sokoloff Hypothesis”, Munich Personal RepEc Archive Paper 
No. 5869, 2007. 
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settlers were to dominate a labour force of indigenous people and African 
slaves”, concluding fairly well with a geographical pointing: “Such a 
description indeed comes remarkably close to and ‘average’ Latin American 
country”.17 
 
Table 2.1. Land Inequality in the Americas. 
 
 
 
Source: The author with data from Frankema, “Colonial Origins”, 29-32. Data for Cuba are 
from  Will Moore, Ronny Lindström and Valerie O'Regan, “Land reform, political violence 
and the economic inequality-political conflict nexus: A longitudinal analysis”, International 
Interactions, Vol. 21, No. 4, 1996. 
 
 
Thus, ES build an economic history of the Americas as represented in 
Diagram 1 Current economic performance would be the outcome of a 
three-step causal chain: first, the initial factor endowment’s impact on 
colonial inequality and institutions; second, impact of colonial 
institutions on current institutions and, third, impact of current 
institutions on current economic performance. The second step, the 
hypothesis of institutional persistence, lies at the heart of much of the 
contemporary (and most significant) research on economic growth and 
development.  
 
 
 
                                                        
17 Frankema, “Colonial Origins”, 18. 
 GINI INDEX YEAR  GINI INDEX YEAR 
PLANTATION COLONIES MAINLAND SPANISH AMERICA 
Barbados 84.8 1989 Bolivia 76.8 1970 
Cuba 79 1945 Colombia 74.3 1988 
Jamaica 75.7 1961 Ecuador 77.2 1974 
Haiti 46.2 1971 El Salvador 78.3 1961 
Simple average 79.8 Guatemala 77 1964 
NORTH ATLANTIC COLONIES Mexico 60.7 1960 
United States 71.9 1987 Peru 81.1 1994 
Canada 52.6 1961 Venezuela 85.7 1961 
Simple average 62.3 Simple average 76,7 
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These works have undoubtedly challenged the direction of contemporary 
research on economic growth. Their ideas on the colonial origins of 
current economic performance and, in particular, the hypothesis of 
institutional persistence have allowed scholars to connect growth 
economics with economic history, a fairly fruitful marriage. As indicated, 
their theses present a quite plausible story and empirical works confirms 
them. Their merit is beyond question. However, this approach, largely 
satisfactory as it is, may lead to cast a shadow over other causal 
relationships and forces equally responsible of current economic 
performance. Several questions arise. First: if factor endowments are the 
answer, how to explain, then, substantial divergence across regions 
within the ES’s same type of colony or across Frankema’s ‘typical 
unequal countries’? Note the divergent paths between plantation 
colonies in Figure 2.1 or the breathtaking ‘Haitian exception’ in Table 
2.1. Second: is it plausible to accept that a minority of 19th, 17th or even 
16th-century Europeans are the responsible for current institutional 
features and economic performance? Gareth Austin and C. A. Bayly have 
rightly pointed out some tentative answers.18  According to Austin, the 
‘compression of history’ and the emphasis on single causes have obscured 
the role of the colonised peoples in making their own history. In his own 
words, further research should incorporate “the positive power of 
indigenous agency, rather than simply the small numbers of European 
present, as a determinant of institutional choice in African – and Asian and 
Latin American – colonies and former colonies”.19  
 
 
 
 
                                                         
18 Bayly, “Indigenous and Colonial Origins” and Austin, “The ‘reversal of fortune’ thesis”. 
19 Austin, “The ‘reversal of fortune’ thesis”, 1020. 
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Figure 2.1. Divergence between plantation colonies 
 
Evolution in per capita incomes, 1990 International Geary-Khamis dollars 
 
Source: The author with data from Angus Maddison, The World Economy. Historical 
Statistics (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2003). 
 
 
3. Politics and the weakening of the institutional persistence. 
 
Austin’s concerns regarding indigenous agency seem to fit well into a 
broader critique of the institutionalist literature that revolves around the 
notions of ‘politics’, ‘political interests’ or ‘political economy factors’. As 
with the elusive notion of ‘institutions’, a lack of consensus about the 
precise meaning of ‘politics’ has not prevented the emergence of a 
theoretical apparatus that tries to shed some light wherever geography, 
institutions or trade do not reach.  
Economists’ interest in politics is not as novel as it could seem. It is true 
that, in the context of the new institutional economics and the new 
political economy, scholars have recently pointed at this shaky field in 
their quest for the foundations of a stable private market economy.20                                                         
20 See Douglass North and Barry Weingast, “Concluding Remarks: The Emerging New 
Economic History of Latin America” in Haber, S. (ed), Political Institutions and Economic 
Growth in Latin America. Essays in Policy, History and Political Economy (Stanford, 
California: Hoover Institution Press, 2000) and Barry Weingast, “The Economic Role of 
Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development”, Journal of 
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But, contrasting with this apparently avant-garde trend, John 
Coatsworth invokes the old concerns of structuralists, Marxists and their 
successive mid-20th century offspring when he both applauds and calls for 
the re-emergence of political economy in the economic history of Latin 
America.21 “Institutions have histories”, he states.22 Hence, rather than 
pointing to their inalterable nature, he suggests how institutions are 
created and maintained by private groups and public entities in the 
political arena and how they are shaped by external shocks and 
endogenous threats.  
ES’s theories have not escaped unharmed from these critiques. More or 
less belligerently, both the role of factor endowments and the existence of 
a resilient discriminatory institutional framework has been contested. 
Barry Weingast, Douglass North and Larry Summerhill (WNS) accept 
factor endowments as critical constraints on political and economic 
behaviour but do not consider the latter as a direct outcome of the 
former.23 Beyond endowments, some room is still left in order to explain 
why, in contrast with the United States, the immediate post-
Independence era plunged Spanish America into economic and political 
turmoil. Whereas in Spanish America a dense web of corporate rights and 
privileged groups clashed with republican aspirations, in the States the 
new political system was the natural adaptation of a more liberal, less 
centralized and more law-bound empire. Thus, contrasting political 
interests created by colonial institutions and policies had much to say in 
the divergence within the Americas. 
Jeffrey Nugent and James Robinson (NR) undertake a more precise 
attack.24 Controlling for both colonial power and factor endowments, 
they face a puzzling economic divergence between two pairs of Latin 
American coffee-exporting countries. ‘Endowments are not fate’, they 
conclude. Political economy factors and, more specifically, the nature of 
political competition in a society (predominance of the military vis-à-vis 
competitive elections) as well as the composition of the elites (landowners 
vis-à-vis merchants) are decisive when trying to explain why Guatemala 
and El Salvador fell behind in comparison with Costa Rica and 
Colombia. Elites without much stake in landowning in the context of a 
less militarized state were both less willing and less able to undertake the 
land confiscation and the labour repression required by a system of large                                                                                                                                              
Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 11, No. 1, 1995. In the latter, particularly interesting 
is the notion of ‘market-preserving federalism’.   
21 John Coatsworth, “Structures, Endowments, and Institutions in the Economic History of 
Latin America”, Latin America Research Review, Vol. 40, No. 3, 2005. 
22 Coatsworth, “Structures”, 138. 
23 Weingast, North and Summerhill, “Order, Disorder and Economic Change”. 
24 Nugent and Robinson, “Are Endowments Fate?” 
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plantations. Thus, in Costa Rica and Colombia, a legal environment more 
favourable to land distribution arose and, with a smallholding 
organization of the coffee industry, human capital accumulation and 
socio-economic development were both faster and deeper. Like WNS, NT 
do not leave unaddressed the question regarding the endogeneity of these 
political economy factors: a peripheral position and subtle differences in 
the economic organization under Spanish rule would explain the degree 
of state militarization and the socioeconomic background of elites in the 
post-Independence era.  
These critiques seem to have forced a re-examination of ES’s theses. 
Rather than to accept persistent institutions in a relatively uncontested 
socio-political scenario, ES have recently come to admit that past 
institutions should be regarded more as constraints than as determinants 
of the current ones.25 Transitions exist and they are not easily 
understood, they add, suggesting the existence of a missing link. They 
end up, however, being more explicit: “The nature of the political power 
structure in society is critical in determining which institutions are 
adopted”.26 
 
 
Thus, it is not surprising that Peter Lindert has included an ‘exogenous 
political history’ variable in his recent review of Sokoloff’s work on 
inequality.27 As Diagram 2 shows, politics has entered into the equation 
of economic and political development. Although the idea of persistence                                                         
25 See the late works by Engerman and Sokoloff: “Institutional and Non-Institutional 
Explanations of Economic Differences”, National Bureau of Economic Research Working 
Paper 9989, 2003, and “Debating the Role of Institutions in Political and Economic 
Development: Theory, History, and Findings”, Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 11, 
2008. Even the work on political transitions by Acemoglu seems a reasonable development 
of 2001 AJR’s warning on the need to look at ‘more fundamental institutions’ when trying to 
understand the origins and changes in property rights regimes or rule of law. See Acemoglu, 
“A Theory of Political Transitions”, The American Economic Review, Vol. 91, No. 4, 2001. 
26 Engerman and Sokoloff, “Debating the Role”, 127. 
27 Peter Lindert, “Kenneth Sokoloff on Inequality in the Americas” (Preliminary Draft) in 
Costa, D. L. and Lamoreaux, N. R, (eds), Understading Long-Run Economic Growth: Essays 
in Honor of Kenneth L. Sokoloff (Forthcoming from University of Chicago Press). 
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continues to hold a preferential position, accepting the impact of politics 
amounts to weaken the role of factor endowments as the single 
determinant of current institutions and economic performance. The first 
of the questions posed in the previous section obtains thus a tentative 
answer. But several points remain. First: despite the efforts by WNS, NR 
or Coatsworth to track the origins of the ‘politics’ variable, Lindert does 
not face its endogenous nature. It seems a tricky strategy: to accept the 
role of politics only as an exogenous element amounts to preserving 
factor endowments as the almost unique significant variable. After all, 
exogenous political events (e.g., the French Revolution at the French 
West Indies or Spain’s Independence War in Spanish America) were 
certainly the exception rather than the rule. Secondly and closely related, 
my second question: how to incorporate Austin’s claims in this revised 
framework? To fit indigenous agency under the ‘exogenous political 
history’ heading is clearly wrong. Colonised peoples were, after all, 
colonised. They lived and worked under the constraints and the 
incentives of the colonial regimes. In a nutshell: whatever indigenous 
political, economic or social agency we consider, it always came from 
inside the boundaries of the colonial regime.  
Hence, recognition of both internal instability and the drive of native 
peoples seems to describe better the abundant historical evidence of late 
colonial and early Republican Spanish America. Scholars have put 
forward a number of theories in order to explain what is an indisputable 
fact: the political disorder experienced by Spanish America in the post-
Independence era.28 Whatever the result with respect to the controversy 
about whether the decades between 1820 and 1870 were decisive in the 
Latin American falling behind or not, Spanish America did lose its 
institutional equilibrium since 1820.29 Caudillismo, conflicting elites, 
conservatives and liberals follow one another in the historical accounts of 
the period.30 And when occasionally the region seemed to recover the                                                         
28 A survey of the diverse theories can be found in Frank Safford, “The Problem of Political 
Order in Early Republican Spanish America”, Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 24, 
1992, pp 83-97. 
29  On that controversy, see two works by Leandro Prados de la Escosura: “Growth, 
Inequality, and Poverty in Latin America: Historical Evidence, Controlled Conjectures”, 
Working Paper 05-41(04) - Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, 2005, and “Lost Decades? 
Independence and Latin America’s Falling Behind, 1820-1870”, Working Paper in 
Economic History 07-18 - Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, 2007. Also Victor Bulmer-
Thomas, The Economic History of Latin America since Independence (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003.) 
30 For example, on caudillismo, Percy A. Martin, “Artigas, the Founder of Uruguayan 
Nationality”, The Hispanic American Historical Review, Vol. 19, No. 1, 1939; on federalist 
tendencies, J. Lloyd Mecham, “The Origins of Federalism in Mexico”, The Hispanic 
American Historical Review, Vol. 18, No. 2, 1938; and, on conflcting elites, S. Rao, “Arbitres 
of Change: Provincial Elites and the Origins of Federalism in Argentina’s Littoral, 1814-
1820”, The Americas, Vol. 64, No. 4, 2008. For his part, Safford provides an excellent 
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equilibrium, it did not necessarily fit into the institutional traits of the 
disappeared empire. This situation is even clearer in the case of 
plantation colonies. Slave resistance as an intrinsic element of these 
societies was already highlighted by Herbert Aptheker in 1943. Succesive 
studies of different plantation colonies by C. L. R James (Saint 
Domingue), Eugene Genovese (US South) and Michael Craton (British 
West Indies) have tended to corroborate the usual nature of slave 
rebellions in the Americas31. Conflict between exploiters and exploited 
were frequently accompanied by internal struggles among the dominant 
classes. In the case of the French colony of Saint Domingue, slave 
rebellion and temporal turmoil gave way to the complete toppling of the 
colonial system in 1804.  
Diagram 3 depicts the main thesis of this paper. Although it shows a 
powerful explanatory power at the big picture level, the idea of the 
persistence of colonial institutions must be nuanced in order to accept the 
existence of other causal relations. In ES’s plantation and mainland 
Spanish America colonies, factor endowments and early inequality 
contributed initially to shape a set of colonial institutions largely 
characterised by its discriminatory nature. Small European elites built a 
legal system and implemented a diversity of policies (land, immigration, 
schooling, suffrage) clearly beneficial to their interests.  However, and 
here is my main point, the exploitative and discriminatory nature of the 
system itself fuelled disaffection and contestation not only among 
exploited but frequently also among upper strata, which fought between 
them in order to preserve the control of the rents. Political events outside 
colonial dominions undoubtedly played a role in influencing changes but 
the strongest pressures against colonial or early post-colonial institutions 
came precisely from inside the colonial regime. Under particular 
circumstances, these pressures turned into overt rebellion and, when 
successful, into a re-configuration of the institutional system and 
economic performance.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                              
overall overview of these issues in Frank Safford, “Politics, Ideology and Society in Post-
Independence Spanish America” in Bethel, L. (ed.), The Cambridge History of Latin 
America, Vol. III: From Independence to c. 1870 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1985). 
31 James, “Black Jacobins”; Genovese, “From Rebellion to Revolution”; Craton, “Testing the 
Chains”.  
 16 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A comparison among the plantation colonies of Cuba and Saint 
Domingue can allow us to check the validity of this hypothesis and shed 
more light on these interaction between factor endowments, political 
economy factor, institutional change and economic performance. With 
almost identical factor endowments as Table 3.1 shows, both regions 
were colonised by European powers (French in Saint Domingue and 
Spaniards in Cuba) and, in successive periods, they became both 
irreplaceable sugar providers and the world’s richest colonies. With a 
labour system based on the importation of African slaves, their social 
structures were characterized by racial and economic polarization. And, 
despite all the similarities, they followed astonishingly divergent 
trajectories. At Saint Domingue, civil war between the wealthy elites and 
the only successful slave rebellion in history led to the establishment of 
the first black republic in 1804, Haiti. By 1820, the previous system of 
large plantations had been almost completely dismantled and turned into 
a small-sized subsistence farming economy with an independent 
peasantry. In Cuba, however, not even mainland Spanish America was 
able to carry the island with her in the road to Independence. White 
planters remained loyal to Spain and no significant slave rebellion took 
place. The plantation system was not challenged at all and had to await 
the slow erosion by external technical and economic forces. 
Table 3.1. Factor endowments in Saint Domingue and Cuba. 
Table 3. 1a. Geographic position relative to 18th- and 19th century markets 
 
 
 
 
Source: The author with Google Maps Calculator. 
   a From Havana to Cádiz and from Cap-Haitien to Nantes 
   b From Havana/Cap-Haitien to Boston 
   c From Havana/Cap-Haitien to present-day Lagos, Nigeria. 
 
 To Europea To North Americab To   Africac 
Cuba 7,313 Km 2,383 Km 9,307 Km 
Saint Domingue 6,971 Km 2,518 Km 8,271 Km 
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Table 3. 1b. Climate and soil quality. 
 Climate Soil Quality 
Cuba Equatorial/Winter dry-monsoonal Medium Resilience/High-medium performance 
Saint Domingue Equatorial/Winter dry-fully humid High-medium resilience/High-medium performance 
Source: The author with data from Köppen-Geiger Climate Classification, 2010 and US Department of 
Agriculture, 2003. 
Table 3. 1c. Demographic conditions at the beginning of the sugar expansion. 
 Total Area Arable Land Population 
Population density 
(population /      total 
area) 
Population density 
(population / arable 
land) 
Cuba 11,164,400 Ha 7,494,000 Ha. 171,620 a 0.0155 0.023 
Saint Domingue 2.313,500 Ha 846,000 Ha. 7,900 b 0,3413 0.009 
 
Source: Author’s calculations with data from Denis Laurent-Ropa, Haïti, une coloine français (Paris: 
L’Harmattan, 1993), Alexander von Humboldt, The Island of Cuba. A political essay (New York: 
Derby and Jackson, 1856), Frank Knight, Slave Society in Cuba during the nineteenth century 
(Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1970) and FAO, 2003. 
a Around 1774 
b Around 1675 
 
 
 
4. The political economy of the plantation colonies. Sainte Domingue and 
Cuba. 
 
4.1. Saint Domingue. 1750s – 1850s. 
 
Economy. The decline of the British West Indies, as well as in 
Martinique, from the 1750s combined with the success of the planters’ 
demands to provide Saint Domingue the definitive push towards its 
‘golden age’ between 1763 and 1791. Around 1791, the colony’s annual 
worth to France was 500 million livres tournoises, which was based on the 
fact that not only had the French possession turned by then into the 
largest slave colony in the Caribbean but that, from the 1770s onwards, 
the productivity of the slave labour was the highest in the world.32  
The economic foundations of Saint Domingue had been, however, laid at 
least one century before. Both the active distribution of land and the                                                         
32 Thomas Ott, The Haitian Revolution, 1789-1804 (Knoxville, Tennesse: The University of 
Tennesse Press, 1973), 6. 
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importation of cultigens (sugarcane, coffee, cocoa, cotton) under 
governor d’Ogeron’s mandate (1666-75) forced the colonial 
administration to face the evidence. A regime of small proprietorship 
with white indentured servants and an almost inexistent native 
population was condemned not to provide any economic value. The 
requirements of a plantation economy, beginning with tobacco around 
1670 and continuing with indigo from 1685, were different. ‘The great 
problem was to find proper day labourers for the fields’.33 In 1681, there were 
only 2,000 Negro slaves in the colony.34 
Figueres 4.1 and 4.2 show how the situation rapidly changed. Putting 
aside temporal interruptions, the arrival of a number of slaves per year 
below 5,000 between 1711 and the late 1730s turned into a two-fold 
increase between 1738 and 1763, year in which planters’ demands on the 
liberalisation of the slave trade prevailed. Between 1764 and 1791, an 
average of 18,000 slaves per year were imported into Saint Domingue. 
This three-period division can also be observed in terms of output: in 
1710, the production of sugar was 2,920 tons; in 1767, it has increased to 
62,640 tons and, in 1791, to 78,696 tons. 
This fabulous production was set into circulation within the narrow 
channels of the French colonial trade system: French slavers exchanged 
manufactures for Negroes in West Africa and brought the slaves to the 
Caribbean possessions; from there, non-processed sugar and coffee, and in 
lesser degree also indigo and cotton, were exported to France, which sent 
back to its colonies manufactures and capital.35 This triangular trade was 
mainly subordinated to the accumulation of bullion inside the Parisian 
coffers. The long-standing restrictions regarding the free import of slaves 
and other goods as well as the prohibition of processing commodities in 
the colonies had encouraged the rise of the French bourgeoisie, while 
raising the prices and constraining the supply faced by increasingly 
disaffected planters in the colonies. As a consequence of the reforms 
between the 1760s and 1780s and the continuing recourse to commerce 
with Great Britain and its American colonies, the ‘semi-feudal’ elites of 
‘the Pearl of the Antilles’ ‘had a taste of free trade but wanted more’. 36 
Society. This clash between the interests of, on one hand, the 
metropolitan bourgeoisie and the royal bureaucracy and, on the other, 
the grand blancs (‘big whites’) was not, however, the only social cleavage 
that this burgeoning colonial economy was aggravating, even                                                         
33 José Luis Franco, Historia de la Revolución de Haiti (La Habana: Instituto de Historia-
Academia de Ciencias de Cuba, 1966), 121. 
34 Ibid., 126 
35 Ibid., 124. 
36 Ott, The Haitian Revolution, 9. 
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originating. Alongside the lines of race and economic prosperity, Saint 
Domingue’s society was an increasingly fragmented and unstable one.37 
The grand blancs were confronted with a heterogeneous group of less 
favoured rural and urban whites: the petit blancs (‘small whites’). 
Encompassing artisans, small merchants and shopkeepers as well as 
plantation overseers and managers, the petit blancs were undergoing the 
closing off of their chances for property ownership and an increasing 
competition in their trades by some mulattos quickly climbing up their 
ranks.38 Their skin colour made them share with the grand blancs an 
intensifying racial prejudice. This was, in fact, their only point in 
common. A point, however, not strong enough to build up a cohesive 
bloc.39 
Racial prejudice seems a logical consequence in the context of late 
colonial Saint Domingue. Fears of slave insurrection were common for 
the 30 years prior to 1791. 40 Plantations were frequently shaken by slave 
suicide and poisoning of their white master and his relatives. Some of 
them ran away to the rain forests and mountains in order to establish 
autonomous communities of maroons who raided plantations for food 
and women. As Carolyn Fick has tried prominently to show, a growing 
number of forces ‘from below’ had started to play: despite traditional 
depictions as naïve and fainthearted, slaves were increasingly beaten by 
the ‘consciousness of one’s own self-existence’.41 A common language – 
créole –, African music and rituals, and, especially, a syncretistic religion 
– voodoo – were starting to work as powerful cohesive elements.42 
The conditions under which this ‘sense of human dignity’ was emerging 
have been well depicted.43 Table 4.1 shows the size of the slave 
population in 1791: nearly half a million of slaves, of whom two thirds 
were born in Africa coming from a variety of regions, with a Western 
African majority.44 Ethno racial fragmentation was deliberately 
reinforced by occupational hierarchy, with a small number of slaves 
working as skilled craftsmen or domestic servants and an overwhelming 
majority being field hands. It was in the plantation where the cruelty of                                                         
37 Clarence Munford and Michael Zeuske, “Black Slavery, Class Struggle, Fear and 
Revolution in St. Domingue and Cuba, 1785-1795”, The Journal of Negro History, Vol. 73, 
No. 4, 1988, 14. 
38 Carolyn Fick, The Making of Haiti. The Saint Domingue Revolution from Below 
(Knoxville, Tenesse: The University of Tennessee Press, 1990), 18. 
39 Franco, Historia, 154, 179. Fick, The Making, 18. 
40 Munford and Zeuske, “Black Slavery”, 18-19.  
41 Fick, The Making, 39. 
42 Fick, The Making, 42-45. Franco, Historia 162-168. Ott, The Haitian Revolution, 15. 
43 Ott, The Haitian Revolution, 13-18. Franco, Historia, 136-145, 161-172. Fick, The Making, 
25-45. 
44 Fick, The Making, 25-26. Franco, Historia, 133, 165. Ott, The Haitian Revolution, 13. 
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the master had no limits: working and living conditions depressed 
fertility rates while mortality rates rocketed, being more economical to 
work slaves to death and replace them than to promote their 
reproduction. Louis XIV’s 1685 Code Noir (‘Black Code’) was reimposed 
in 1784 in order to guarantee a minimum protection for the slaves but 
planters’ racial and economic interests soon turned it into a dead letter.45 
Not even the Church had a significant presence. 
 
Table 4.1. Racial composition in Cuba and Saint Domingue 
Cuba 
 
1774 1827 1841 1860 
 
Share of 
total  Share of total  Share of total  
Share of 
total 
Whites 96,440 0.56 311,051 0.44 418,291 0.42 793,484 0.57 
Free coloureds 36,301 0.21 106,494 0.15 152,838 0.15 225,843 0.16 
Slaves 38,879 0.23 286,942 0.41 436,495 0.43 370,553 0.27 
Total 171,620  704,487  1,007,624  1,389,880  
Source: Frank W. Knight, Slave Society in Cuba during the nineteenth century. (Madison, 
Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1970) 
 
Saint Domingue 
 
c. 1788-89 
 Share of total 
Whites 40,000 0.08 
Free coloureds 28,000 0.08 
Slaves 405,564 0.86 
Total 473,564  
Source: Richard K. Lacerte, “The Evolution of Land and Labour in the Haitian Revolution, 
1791-1820”,The Americas, Vol. 34, No. 4, 1978. 
 
 
                                                        
45 The ‘Le Jeune case’ is a paradigmatic example regarding the limits of official humanitarian 
protection vis à vis the private interests of the racist Saint Domingue’s society. Fick, The 
Making, 37-38. Franco, Historia, 143-144. Ott, The Haitian Revolution, 16.  
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However, it was not this mass of black slaves who had the leading role at 
the early times of the revolution. An important number of gens de couleur 
(‘peoples of colour’ or mulattos) were trapped into a schizophrenic 
position between the prosperity typical of grand blancs and the racial 
prejudice against any drop of African ancestry. Both contemporary and 
18th century observers agree that it was precisely the mulatto elite who 
played ‘a central role in transforming the French Revolution into the Haitian 
Revolution’.46 
On one hand, mulattos owned around one third of all plantations and 
slaves.47 In the decades prior to 1791, interracial marriages and success in 
the rural economy had allowed them to achieve and preserve economic 
prosperity and social respect.48 Both their devotion to and racism toward 
black slaves as well as their desire for French acculturation brought them 
closer to grand blancs, falling out with petit blancs. On the other hand, 
however, racial prejudice prevented their political rise. From the 1750s 
their prosperity had reinforced racial tension: economically and racially 
threatened, the grand blancs supported an ‘Aristocratic Reaction’  and a 
set of discriminatory anti-mulatto laws were passed.49 Pushing for 
finding the political voice to their increasing prosperity, these self-
identificated creole and French unleashed all the social tensions 
underlying ‘the Pearl of the Antilles’.  
Ideology and rebellion. The internal dynamics of the plantation economy 
of Saint Domingue had generated, by 1789, an explosive scenario.  Two 
exogenous factors, however, contributed to light the wick of open 
revolution: the French abolitionist ideology and the burst of the French 
Revolution.  
For several decades, evangelical Protestantism and the French 
Enlightenment nourished abolitionist ideology. The end of the slave 
trade and the abolition of slavery were seen as necessary steps towards 
the avant--garde doctrine of race amalgamation.50 Despite colonial 
precautions, revolutionary pamphlets arrived to Saint Domingue and 
were fervently read by free mulattos and literate slaves like Toussaint 
Louverture.51 In Paris, the Societé des Amis des Noirs (‘Society of the                                                         
46 John Garrigus, “Colour, Class and Identity on the Eve of the Haitian Revolution: Saint-
Domingue’s Free Coloured Elite as Colons américains”, Slavery and Abolition, Vol. 17, No. 
1, 1996, 20. See also Franco, Historia, 203. 
47 Frank Moya,“Haiti and Santo Domingo, 1790–c.1870” in Bethel, L. (ed.). The Cambridge 
History of Latin America, Vol III: From Independence to c. 1870 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1985), 238.  
48 Garrigus, “Colour”, 21. 
49 Franco, Historia, 159-160. Garrigus, “Colour”, 26, 29, 30. 
50 Munford and Zeuske, “Black Slavery”, 22.  
51 Ott, The Haitian Revolution, 20. Munford and Zeuske, “Black Slavery”, 22. 
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Friends of the Negroes’) was founded in 1788 by Condorcet, Pétion, 
Mirabeau and others in order to advance the abolition of the slavery. At 
first, however, they adopted a gradualist approach and campaigned 
loudly in favour of mulatto equality.52  
Eventually the ‘supreme irony’ became evident: it was the wealth 
accumulated by the slave traders, big merchants and sugar-refining 
families of France who funded the intellectual and political activities of a 
revolutionary bourgeoisie partly responsible for the black emancipation 
and subsequent fall of the sickly trade. When the Estates-General were 
convened in May 1789, the grand blancs sent a colonial committee to 
Paris to made their claims heard by the royal bureaucracy. More home 
rule and economic freedom exclusively for whites clashed with the 
demands of mulattos’ leaders, supported by the Amis des Noirs. Despite 
the Declaration of Rights of Man and Citizen, gens de couleur were 
excluded from the recently allowed colonial assemblies and Vicent Ogé, a 
rich mulatto, led a failed revolt in October 1790. By then, the ‘mulatto 
question’ had become popular in France and eventually a Jacobin-
controlled National Assembly passed full citizenship for propertied 
mulattoes in May 1791. In a wildly polarized Saint Domingue, slaves 
took chance and rebelled the night of August 22.53 
Land distribution. The black uprising must be seen, though importantly 
driven by racial considerations, as ‘a larger and more complex process of 
revolutionary change’ that overturned the productive structure of Saint 
Domingue’s economy.54 In an agriculture-based world, as slaves were 
achieving new heights of independence, it soon became clear that 
‘freedom for the mass of insurgent slaves, if it was to realized at all, was 
fundamentally intertwined with an independent claim to land’.55 With an 
almost nonexistent manufacturing sector, newly emancipated slaves 
faced two options: to work as wage earners in the old plantations or to till 
their own fields. Eventually, only the latter prevailed.  
 
There is no evidence that the planned purpose of rebel slaves in 1791 was 
to break up their masters’ plantations and to distribute the land in an 
egalitarian fashion. Surely they only took advantage of a power vacuum 
in a context of growing false rumours of emancipation by the kings of 
France and Spain. Nevertheless, under French domination, slaves had                                                         
52 Ott, The Haitian Revolution, 21. 
53 The course of events between 1789-91, as well as the subsequent civil and international war, 
are depicted with great detail in Ott, The Haitian Revolution, 28-64; Franco, Historia, 173-
220; Fick, The Making, 76-88.  
54 Carolyn Fick, “Emancipation in Haiti: From Plantation Labour to Peasant Proprietorship”, 
Slavery and Abolition, Vol. 21, No 2, 2000, 11. 
55 Ibid., 15. 
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become closely attached to land. In the plantation, each black family 
was provided with a small plot of land for their personal use and 
individual profit. Originally thought as a way to depress owners’ costs, 
this ‘proto strip-farming peasant complex’ was reasserted by the 1784-85 
Bourbon humanitarian reforms of the Code Noir.56 Eventually, the slaves 
considered these plots as their own personal holdings.57 Similarly, 
manumitted slaves were allowed to continue living in the plantations, 
where they were allotted a larger plot. In the coffee estates, the different 
cultivation process favoured among the slaves a stronger sense of 
property regarding the section of coffee trees they took care of.58 Though 
more controversial, some authors also point to maroonage and its system 
of small private property devoted to subsistence farming as a sign of the 
eagerness for land.59 Thus, it seems logical to conclude, as Lacerte does, 
that ‘the link between freedom and landownership was forged on the 
plantation’. 60  
 
It took time, nonetheless, to materialize this link. During the civil and 
international war which followed the slaves’ rebellion, black leadership 
was well aware of the fact that the necessary revenues to maintain their 
army only could come from the exportation of sugar.61 The defence of 
black emancipation required the maintenance of the plantation economy. 
The 1800 Rural Code and 1801 Constitution, enacted by Toussaint 
Louverture, established a system in which the ex-slaves, nominally free, 
were tied to the land and receive as wage one quarter of the net 
revenues.62 Under Dessalines (1804-06), ex-slaves continued in this new 
servile status while an aggressive confiscation policy put around two 
thirds of Haiti’s land area under public domain. 63Henri Christophe, 
Emperor of the northern Kingdom of Haiti (1811-20), also continued 
Toussaint’s coercive labour policy.64 These attempts to maintain the 
plantation economy harvested economic success although they were 
severely contested by peasant rebellions and the pre-1791 production and 
                                                        
56 Munford and Zeuske, “Black Slavery”, 13.  
57 Fick, “Emancipation”, 14.  
58 Lacerte, “Evolution”, 451-452. 
59 Ibid., 451. 
60 Ibid., 452. 
61 Apart from the internal struggles, both Spain and Great Britain, pushed by imperial calling, 
occupied parts of Saint Domingue, supporting different factions. The independence of the 
black Republic of Haiti (from Ayiti, ‘mountainous land’ in the native Arawak language) was 
declared by Dessalines on January 1, 1804.  
62 Frank Moya, “Haiti and Santo Domingo, 1790–c.1870” in Bethel, L. (ed.), The Cambridge 
History of Latin America, Vol III: From Independence to c. 1870 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1985.), 248-249. Fick, “Emancipation”, 22-27. 
63 Moya, “Haiti and Santo Domingo”, 249. 
64 Fick, “Emancipation”, 32-33. Lacerte, “Evolution”, 456. N, 249. 
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export levels never were reached again.65 Eventually, however, the 
contradiction between general emancipation and plantation system 
became evident.66 In a context of increased internal peace, both Pétion 
(1806-18), in the southern Republic of Haiti, and Boyer (1818-43), in the 
unified Republic, initiated policies of massive land distribution among 
former officials and the black masses as a way to reward service and 
guarantee allegiance.67 The distribution of land became unrecognizable. 
The resulting free peasantry turned to small-sized subsistence farming, 
agricultural production stagnated, state revenues plummeted and only 
coffee survived as a significant export crop.  
 
4.2. Cuba. 1760s – 1860s. 
Economy. Before the mid-18th century, the island of Cuba was basically a 
settler colony. Small-scale farmers – tobacco, beeswax, cattle – and 
artisans made up the bulk of its productive fabric.68 By then, sugar 
production was still purely symbolic: similarly to Saint Domingue’s 
experience, exploitation of favourable climatic conditions and land 
superabundance was limited by the unavailability of labourers.69 The 
extermination of the indigenous population and the high opportunity 
cost of coming for Castilian people eventually made inevitable the 
importation of slaves, whose number there was by then the lowest in all 
the Caribbean except in the convict colony of Puerto Rico.70 British 
occupation of Havana between 1762 and 1763 represented the shock 
sugar expansion required: 4,000 slaves as well as long-term commercial 
arrangements, machinery and capital were brought to Cuba.71 
In subsequent years, the Bourbon Reforms satisfied the demands of the 
enlightened elites and planters, who, led by Francisco de Arango y 
Parreño, focused all their efforts on the promotion of agriculture.72 Under 
these new circumstances, sugar planters were able to take full advantage 
of the destruction of Saint Domingue’s industry, the opening of the 
United States’ market after 1776 and the steady development of a sugar 
market in Europe. Exiles from Saint Domingue brought with them 
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further innovations such as water-driven mills.73 Tobacco lands were 
converted to sugar plantations and, although coffee experienced a 
noticeable expansion until the 1850s, sugar quickly dominated, 
particularly in the Western Department and Havana’s surroundings.74 
As Figure 4.2. shows, between the 1770s and 1830s, Cuba experienced 
what Allahar has termed ‘easy sugar expansion’: the lack of significant 
foreign competition, the ready supply of slaves and the availability of 
fresh lands made possible a steady increase in sugar production without 
paying much attention to efficiency improvements. 75 By the end of the 
Napoleonic wars, Cuba had replaced Saint Domingue as the richest 
tropical colony in the world.76 
Around the 1840s, however, circumstances began to change. The Cuban 
sugar industry controlled by newcomers started to react to the growing 
challenge posed by European beetroot and falling prices. Cutting costs 
and mechanization (steam-engine, vacuum boiler, railroads) were 
becoming the indispensable conditions for survival.77 New lands beyond 
the Havana region were put under cultivation, the scale of operations in 
sugar plantations was enlarged and a steady process of land 
concentration began.78 Sugar production rocketed and, in the 1860s, 
Cuba became the supplier of one fourth of the global sugar production.79 
Although shortages of available wageworkers and the labour intensive 
nature of sugar production in the old-fashioned plantations maintained 
the influx of slaves (see Figure 4.1), higher slaves’ prices encouraged 
European and Chinese immigration between the 1850s and 1870s.80 
Underlying these extraordinary achievements, socio-economic 
fragmentation among planters’ ranks was already evident by the 1860s. 
In the Western and Central Departments, old oligarchic families, whose 
old-fashioned mills dated from the royal grants of 18th century or before, 
had assisted in the emergence of the much more mechanized mills of self-
made immigrants.81 In contrast, those planters who could not access 
sources to fund the increased capital requirements fell behind.82                                                         
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Especially in the eastern part of the island, a mass of smaller, inefficient 
and impoverished sugar and coffee planters developed. 
 
Figure 4.1. Slave Importations in Saint Domingue and Cuba, 1700-1870. 
 
Source: The author with from Atlantic Slave Trade Database. Emory University, 
http://slavesvoyages.org/tast/index.faces 
Figure 4.2. London sugar prices and sugar production in Saint Domingue 
and Cuba, 1700-1870. 
 
Source: The author with data from N. Deerr,The History of Sugar 
(London: Chapman and Hall Ltd, 1950) 
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Society. Unlike Saint Domingue, fear of slave rebellion sealed an atypical 
entente cordiale between the royal bureaucracy and the planters. The 
alignment of interests was evident: the promotion of agriculture involved 
slavery and slavery necessarily involved the existence of strong military 
and political power. Thus, enlightened elites and planters, putting aside 
any radical impulse, resigned themselves to seek progressive liberal 
reforms within the empire outwards and to suffer an acute identity crisis 
at home.83 As a reward, colonial authorities satisfied planters’ socio-
economic demands: free trade in 1765 and 1776, free imports of slaves in 
1789, constitutional preservation of slavery in 1812, legalization of land 
occupation in 1818-19, even noble titles. 
By the 1840s, the first cracks appeared. At first, slaves’ prices, increasing 
mechanization, liberal political economy and the incipient formation of a 
racist white discourse aimed at the strengthening of the Cuban internal 
cohesion pushed richest planters to cast doubt on the continuation of 
slave trade and slavery.84 Secondly, many planters could not afford 
growing capital requirements and continued to rely largely on slave 
labour. When occasionally Spanish authorities showed some light 
affection towards abolitionism, flirting between Cuban planters and US 
Administration became intense. Slavery preservation and the 
reinforcement of the South within the Union were behind several US 
attempts to purchase the island. Thirdly, a mass of impoverished 
planters, left behind by the infusion of capital and technology, started to 
show unrest. As long as the social conflict started to revolve more around 
economic cleavages than around racial differences, the distance between 
these planters and non-white forces seemed easier to overcome. 
As Table 4.1 shows, slave workforce never reached a relative size 
comparable to Saint Domingue’s one. Only about one third of slaves 
worked on the sugar plantations: sugar industry, coffee and tobacco 
fields, cattle farming and urban trades provided them with alternative 
occupations.85Although working conditions were similar, being a slave 
was possibly less hard in Cuba than in other Caribbean colonial 
possessions.86 Both their formal legal status as well as their higher levels                                                         
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of emancipation seem to corroborate the impression held by 19th-century 
observers.87 As Paquette and Thomas indicate, the domestic (and sexual) 
demands of the ‘frontier life’, the lengthy Spanish experience with 
African slavery and a more centralized and authoritarian state, less 
permeable to colonial interests, combined to provide better protection to 
slaves. Based on medieval Castilian law, Spaniards had a refined slave 
code that provided slaves with certain ‘benefits’: especially, since the 
1520s, the right to purchase freedom (‘coartación’).88 
Slaves’ easier access to freedom and miscegenation soon gave rise to a 
broad stratum of free blacks and mulattos.89As Table 4.1 presents, 
between the 1770s and 1840s, they represented 15-20 percent of total 
population, a feature in stark contrast with the British and French 
Caribbean. They experienced economic betterment during the sugar 
boom and some of them became slaveholders, others running small 
haciendas and estancias.90 Nevertheless, the great majority were 
concentrated in the major urban areas and ports where they worked in 
skilled trades or as artisans. Many had received formal education and 
were admitted into the bureaucracy or the university.91 And, although 
Cuban society never overcame completely racial barriers, their military 
participation in the batallones de pardos y morenos (‘battalions of browns 
and blacks’) and socio-political activities in the cofradías (‘brotherhoods’) 
provided them a sort of social recognition.92 Although not comparable 
with the significant Saint Domingue’s free coloured landowning class, a 
small coloured bourgeoisie had already flourished in Cuba by the end of 
18th century.93  
Thus, despite increased racist tensions since the 1840s, different authors 
agree that Spanish colonial rule in Cuba created an ‘apparently tolerant 
society’ in which ‘more subtle and fluid racial boundaries’ prevailed.94 
Higher integration of slaves into society and the subsequent rise of a 
middle class of coloured people helped to temper the contradiction 
between slaveholders and slaves, certainly favouring the consolidation of 
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colonial status.95 Precisely, it would not be a mass of ‘black Jacobins’ 
who eventually challenged with success the Spanish yoke.  
Ideology and rebellion. Cuban social tensions had also a chance to follow 
the Saint Domingue’s example. Most American possessions took 
advantage of Spain’s political instability and, by 1820, Latin American 
independence was already a reality. In Cuba, however, the impact of 
these exogenous events was not able to galvanize social unrest. It would 
be necessary to wait for another half century to assist to the birth of a 
qualitatively different independence movement.  
In opposition to the traditional narrative, it can be argued that, although 
smaller in scale, the Spanish empire had its own and uniquely attuned 
early anti-slavery movement.96 Thus, when the Napoleonic invasion 
occurred and the Regency Council convened a constitutional process at 
Cádiz in 1808, previously silent Spanish liberal circles had a chance to 
show much they had been exposed to French and British abolitionism.97 
In contrast with France, however, the alliance of planters and 
peninsulares (peoples from mainland Spain) succeeded in leaving 
untouched both the mulatto and the slave questions. Mulatto citizenship 
was left behind the “door of virtue and merit”.98 Similarly, British 
pressures and liberal deputies were unable to refute successfully 
conservative perspectives with regard to slave trade and slavery.99 The 
Haitian spectre and commercial interests were raised and eventually 
constitutional preservation of slavery was granted.  
In Cuba, despite several attempts, political economy conditions and 
satisfied planters isolated the island from any challenge to the status quo 
of the plantation economy. Already in 1796 Nicolás Morales, a free 
mulatto farmer, organized a free coloureds’ conspiracy with some white 
support in Bayamo.100 His aims were to force local authorities to enforce 
the right to buy legal whiteness as well as the abolition of the sales taxes                                                         
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and the redistribution of land from some rich planters. Before any action 
was taken, Morales was betrayed and hanged. In the first months of 1812 
a nation-wide conspiracy made planters shudder.101 Some slave revolts 
had broken out in several parts of the island between January and 
March. Colonial authorities soon unveiled and aborted a movement of 
slaves and free coloureds that, led by the free black José Antonio Aponte, 
planned to attack the plantations. The influence of the abolitionist 
discussions in Cádiz as well as the existence of both inspiration and 
support from Haiti was recognized.102 Moreover, Captain-general and 
Cuban elites were forced to admit how the batallones and cofradías, 
colonial creations intended to favor limited non-white integration, had 
sheltered the plot’s embryo. Even some separatist whites had provided 
support to Aponte. Even, as late 1843-1844, a massive conspiracy of free 
coloured and slaves was dismantled.103 
In contrast, stratification among white planters did bear significant 
fruits. When the possibility of annexation with the US collapsed, 
moderate creole planters fought for more Cuban political control. When 
their proposal of  ‘not taxation without representation’ was rejected by 
Madrid in 1867, they had to assume that a rebellion would risk both their 
wealth and fragile political power. They remained calm. Smaller planters 
in the East were less doubtful.104 Old-fashioned and impoverished as they 
were, they had not much to lose. Their calculated ambiguity towards 
abolition provided them with support from both a sizeable black segment 
and a handful of white reformers.  
The ‘Grito de Yara’ (‘Yara’s shout’) inaugurated the first of the 
independence wars, the ‘Ten Year’s War’ (1868-78).105 They were a 
“conflict between criollos and peninsulares […] almost obliterating colour 
prejudice”, articulated upon a regional East-West cleavage.106 On one 
hand, an independence and pro-abolition movement led by a mass of 
impoverished white countrymen supported by many free mulattos and a 
considerable number of slaves; on the other, the old alliance of Spaniards, 
big merchants and some powerful sugar planters. Although the cross-                                                        
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racial nature of the independence movement guaranteed black 
participation as well as promotion in the army, banning of legal 
segregation and promoting racial equality myths were eventually the 
tools used by white elites to deter protest and the complete fulfilment of 
black aspirations.107 Any land distribution was undertaken at that 
time.108 
 
5. Plantation colonies, slave rebellions and land redistribution.  
 
The socio-political instability of the plantation economies does not seem 
to fit well with the hypothesis of strong institutional persistence posited 
by much of the institutionalist literature. Rather than to accept the 
unchallenged persistence of wealth inequality over time, a more nuanced 
depiction is required.  If the agency of the slave population is going to be 
incorporated into the narrative of comparative development in the 
Americas, the existence of pressures from below and subsequent 
contestation of European domination must be necessarily accepted. 
When particular features of the colonial regime proved not strong enough 
to contain those pressures, open revolt broke out and effective land 
distribution occurred. In a nutshell: plantation economies led to socio-
political instability and, under particular circumstances, this instability 
turned into a lesser degree of economic and even socio-political 
inequality. A careful examination of this assertion is required. 
 
5.1. Slave rebellions and land redistribution 
 
At first: is it acceptable to posit the existence of a direct link between 
slave rebellion and land redistribution? On bare theoretical grounds, it 
seems reasonable to think so. In a context of plantation economies, 
successful rebel slaves faced few alternatives. Opportunities in the small 
number of urban centres were already dominated by free coloureds.                                                         
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Moreover, most slaves represented an unskilled workforce. On the other 
hand, living conditions as wageworkers in their previous masters’ fields 
were not different at all from previous slavery. Freed slaves also had to 
assume their own feeding once the colonial supply of foodstuff had been 
greatly altered. Turning to small-size subsistence farming became, 
therefore, a quite plausible possibility.  
Historical evidence corroborates this prediction. Although it is unlikely 
that slaves had in mind a meticulous destruction of the plantation 
system, a sort of pro-independent peasantry affection had surely 
developed throughout the whole Caribbean. Craton has convincingly 
argued that, in the British West Indies, “many of the slaves were already 
proto-peasants well before the end of formal slavery”109. Slave rebellions at 
Barbados in 1816, Demerara in 1823 and Jamaica in 1831 provide 
enough examples of the link between subsistence farming and slaves’ 
demands110. In Cuba, the 1795 Morales’ plot had as explicit objective the 
distribution of land to slaves whereas in the 1812 Aponte’s conspiracy 
one of the first actions would had been “to burn out both the cane and coffee 
fields”111. Eventually, the Saint Domingue revolution gave rise to a 
completely new subsistence farming system. 
 
5.2. Plantation colonies and slave rebellions. Cuba and Sainte Domingue 
cases. 
 
Secondly: even accepting the link between slave resistance and pressures 
for greater wealth equality, can we assume that the plantation economy 
led inevitably to socio-political unrest and, under certain circumstances, 
to open revolution? In other words: what were the causes of slave 
rebellions? 
Since the 1980s, the answers to these questions have been articulated 
upon two opposed positions112. After Aptheker’s famous statement that 
“resistance, not acquiescence, is the core of the story”, Eugene Genovese’s 
contribution was to provide an overall understanding of a constellation 
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of apparently disconnected slave resistance episodes113. His 
interpretation of slave ‘revolutions’ as exclusively a tropical appendix of 
a global dynamics followed close in James’ footsteps and his non-
accidental characterization of Haitian rebels as ‘black Jacobins’114. 
Europe-born emancipationist ideas provided the transoceanic link.  
These analyses, nevertheless, were soon challenged.  
The Marxist hypothesis did not fit well with, for example, the greater 
impact of the Enlightenment ideas on free coloureds or the counter-
revolutionary stance adopted by rebelled slaves in Saint Domingue.115 
Even Genovese conceded that “the mechanics of ideological transmission 
remain obscure”.116 Among the criticisms, the one by Michael Craton 
stands out117. Even recognizing the influence of 18th century Western 
ideology, Craton denies its obvious, direct or fundamental role. 
Discourses of the Age of Revolution were used into a broader context: 
freedom to recreate a life of their own was the most basic and cohesive 
ideological element among slaves’ masses. Craton, therefore, inevitably 
concentrates on the internal dynamics of slave societies. 
Slaves’ degree of atomization and internalization of colonial values surely 
differed between the two Caribbean colonies. The absolute and relative 
higher number of slaves in Saint Domingue as well as the larger size of 
sugar plantations in all likelihood made easier their communication and 
organization. Voodoo and creole provided slaves a way of overcoming 
occupational and ethnoracial fragmentation behind their masters’ backs. 
Admittedly, in Cuba, cabildos, cofradías, or festivals also played this 
cohesive role118. However, in contrast with Saint Domingue, all these 
institutions had been originally set up by the Spaniards with the aim of 
accelerating the religious conversion and acculturation of newly imported 
blacks. Although, by the 19th century, cabildos and cofradías had lost 
much of their original purposes, they remained always under the 
somehow indulgent look of the colonial bureaucracy. In Cuba, both a                                                         
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higher degree of urbanization and, especially, an easier access to freedom 
also contributed to achieve a higher integration into the colonial society. 
Cuban whites also seem to have been less reluctant to free their 
illegitimate children119. Cities provided a realistic alternative to 
countryside miserable life: as already indicated, two thirds of them 
worked outside the sugar plantations. The hypothesis of the ‘closing of 
the frontier’120 seems then quite plausible: at Saint Domingue, a narrower 
range of alternatives could have pushed slaves to consider rebellion as 
their only viable way out. And, eventually, Humboldt’s qualms should 
not cast shadows on what seems a reasonable assertion: slaves were 
better treated in Cuba that in many other European plantation 
colonies121. It is possible to concede, with Brion Davis, that slavery was a 
single phenomenon in which differentiations of type of labour, place or 
master nationality were less relevant than its overall significance122. 
However, when trying to explain the divergent political economy of 
plantation colonies, these differences do become outstanding. As 
mentioned above, the legal tradition and political system brought by 
Spaniards to Cuba were more favourable to slave protection than those 
colonial regimes in which planters’ interests could prevail more easily. 
We should not harbour many doubts about how this made an effective 
difference in slaves’ predisposition to rebel.  
It is in the free coloured population where is possible to find even more 
contrasting features. In both Cuba and Saint Domingue, the sugar boom 
had allowed a not inconsiderable number of free blacks and mulattos to 
achieve relative prosperity and social recognition. Nevertheless, this 
integration had, after all, quite precise limits: full citizenship, that is, the 
right of having say in the running of the colonial economy, was refused. 
Significant differences explain why the reactions to a similar situation of 
socio-political discrimination were so divergent. Free coloured elite in 
Saint Domingue was basically a rural landowning class whose wealth 
rested upon sugar cultivation. Greatly acculturated and representing half 
of the free population, they were both more inclined and better 
positioned to make their political claims heard. Under these 
circumstances, it is not surprising that, when in 1789 grand blancs                                                         
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threatened to monopolise the power of the sugar-based economy, Saint 
Domingue’s free coloureds took up arms as an independent faction. In 
Cuba, in contrast, free coloured elite amounted almost exclusively to a 
sizeable urban bourgeoisie. Probably they were closer to economically 
successful freed slaves than to rich white planters. Moreover, they 
represented only around 25 percent of free population during the 19th 
century and certainly were less influenced by the ore anaemic Spanish 
liberalism In striking contrast with Saint Domingue, the absence of a 
political struggle between the royal bureaucracy and the white creoles for 
the control of the plantation economy and the lack of a significant stake 
in the sugar industry keep less politically aware free coloureds relatively 
quiet. Given free coloureds’ economic interests, an autonomous quest for 
political equality probably meant much less in Cuba than in Saint 
Domingue. Eventually, reservations of Cuban planters, economic 
proximity and more permeable 
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racial boundaries pushed free blacks and mulattos to made common 
cause, racial boundaries pushed free coloureds to make common cause  
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with slaves, as the racial composition of the 1795, 1812 and 1844 
successive conspiracies demonstrates. 
Regarding white elites’ relation with colonial interests, the conflictive 
strategy followed by grand blancs in Saint Domingue turned into a 
cooperative one in the case of Cuba. The French colonial regime, 
especially after the Estates-General call, and successive economic 
concessions proved unable to contain grand blancs’ demands. Quite 
naively, they thought that they could do without the threatening 
colonial power. In Cuba, the feedback effect was evident: white planters 
had learnt how a maximalist approach on grand blancs’ side had paved 
the way towards political and economic collapse. They adopted a 
gradualist stance that allowed them to retain military protection from 
the motherland against internal or external threats. Additionally, it is 
possible that the political structure of the Spanish Empire provided less 
room to make their claims heard. White planters in Cuba were probably 
less able but certainly less willing to challenge Spanish rule. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Plantation colonies were inherently unstable. The expansion of the 
plantation economy and the colonial constraints under which this 
expansion took place gave rise, sooner or later, to a number of conflicts 
associated with the production and the distribution of colonial rents. 
Conceptual map 3 shows these socio-economic cleavages. 
 
The socio-political events in Cuba and particularly in Saint Domingue 
during the 18th and 19th centuries are more easily understood according 
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to this framework. As Conceptual Maps 1 and 2 present, the demands of 
more economic freedom and self-government by grand blancs, the racial 
and political discrimination against gens de couleur, the intervention of 
the British and Spanish armies, the slaves rebellion and even certain 
aspects of the Revolution in France fit with this framework. In the case 
of Cuba, these conflicts were also present.  Keep in mind Arango’s 
demands regarding free trade, the discrimination against free blacks and 
mulattos, the conspiracies of 1812 or 1844 or the long-standing US 
interests in the purchase of the island. However, both the extent and the 
depth of these cleavages were much lesser. As I have tried to show, 
several features of the Cuban political economy may explain the absence 
of a Saint Domingue-like chain of events. First of all, the Haitian spectre 
and a more centralized Empire helped Spaniards to keep planters quiet. 
Secondly, a larger degree of urbanization reduced the stake of free 
coloureds in the plantation economy, providing them with alternatives 
for wealth accumulation and weakening their anxiety with respect to the 
political control of the colonial economy. Finally, the social costumes, 
the legal tradition and the political organization of the Spanish Empire 
tempered the basic contradiction between planters and slave workforce. 
At Saint Domingue, the absence of similar retaining walls favoured the 
aggravation of the internal dynamics of the plantation colony and, 
eventually, overt conflict, war and slave rebellion occurred. Bourgeois-
democratic ideology and the French Revolution contributed to the 
turmoil but, contrary to Genovese’s theses, its role was marginal and 
indirect. I dare to say that, even in the absence these exogenous forces, 
Saint Domingue could have experienced similar events. I therefore argue 
that the road from social instability to overt conflict was almost a direct 
one. The emergence of new economic and political-institutional traits at 
the new Republic of Haiti, perfectly visible in the transition from the 
plantation economy to a small-sized subsistence farming one, was not at 
all the outcome of exogenous political forces but the result of the usual 
development of the plantation economy. 
 
7. Final remarks 
“<<Vida maravillosa – decía Sofía. Pero detrás de esos árboles hay algo  
inadmisible.>> Y señalaba hacia la fila de altos cipreses, alzados como  
obeliscos verdinegros sobre la vegetación circundante, que ocultaba  
otro mundo: el de los barracones de esclavos que a veces hacían sonar  
sus tambores como un granizo remoto.”  
El Siglo de las Luces, Alejo Carpentier (1904-1980)  
 
 40 
Reality lends itself to AJR’s or ES’s interpretations. At the beginning of 
the 21st century, Haiti ranks the second unequal country in the world 
after Namibia in terms of income, a dubious merit within the highly 
unequal Latin America.123 The earthquake of January 2010, with 
estimates of around 200,000 deaths, brought once more under the 
spotlight the institutional woodworm of a country unable to manage 
complex emergencies. Corruption and constant socio-political unrest, 
even overt violence, fit well with the ‘failed state’ label.124 Cuba, for its 
part, experienced a tumultuous succession of government during the first 
half of the 20th century. Under the pro-egalitarian stance of Castro’s 
regime, Cuba scores close to the praised Costa Rica in the Human 
Development Index with substantial achievements in the realms of 
education and health.125 In any case, the authoritarian nature of the 
system, widespread corruption and an emaciated economy still are some 
of its more salient features.  
On one hand, thus, trying to establish a direct causal chain between an 
adverse colonial heritage, an almost nonexistent institutional apparatus 
and an anaemic economy does not seem a surprising task. What is more: 
it holds a considerable amount of truth. On the other, I am well aware of 
the important limitations of this paper. The choice of Saint Domingue 
has not been random and the ‘selection bias’ is obvious. The ‘Haitian 
exception’ is, after all, an exception. But even bearing this in mind, some 
insights are noteworthy. I have tried to highlight how the ‘big pictures’ 
often obscure both valuable causal relations and salient actors. In 
contrast with the hypothesis of institutional persistence, colonial and 
post-colonial economies often experienced institutional change, 
frequently as a result of socio-political forces. Moreover, these forces had 
been encouraged, often created, by the own dynamics of the colonial 
regime. A successful slave rebellion as the Saint Domingue’s one allows 
us to recognize both the role of political economy factors and the 
significance of slave agency in the narrative of comparative development. 
A more accurate question for further research would be to ask why, even                                                         
123 Evans Jadotte, “The State and Structure of Inequality in the Republic of Haiti” (paper 
presented at the 15th Public Economics Workshop, Universidad de Salamanca, Spain, 
February, 2008) and M. Lundahl, “Income and Land Distribution in Haiti: Some Remarks 
on Available Statistics”, Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 38, No. 
2/3, 1996. 
124 On 19th-century Haiti, from a dependentista perspective, see Alexander Dupuy, “Class 
Formation and Underdevelopment in Nineteenth-Century Haiti”, Race and Class, Vol. 24, 
No. 1, 1982. On rural present-day Haiti, see J. G. Leyburn, J. G, The Haitian People (New 
Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1941) and P. Moral, Le Paysan Haïtien. Étude 
sur la Vie  Rurale en Haïti (Paris:  Maisonneuve & Larose, 1978). 
125 United Nations Development Program, Human Development Report 2009. Human 
Mobility and Development (New York: UNDP, 2009).  
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accepting the existence of a certain institutional flexibility as a result of 
socio-political forces, many of these economies ended up in the long-run 
coming back to an institutional and economic low-level equilibrium trap. 
To answer this and similar questions, I do believe that history, political 
science and social sciences in general have much to say in a realm that 
always valuable economic analysis has come recently to dominate. 
 
Zaragoza-Uncastillo-London-Havana. August-October 2010. 
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